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  In Ian Bache’s introductory paper
1  europeanization was characterized as 
the impact of the European Union on  the ‘politics and policy of  its member 
States’ (p.1). The study of the FCO will concentrate  mainly on what one might 
describe as the impact on  the UK polity (in this case the FCO and its changing 
role in UK policy-making and implementation)  rather than on UK politics or UK 
foreign policy. It may well be the case that the book chapter would benefit from 
being expanded to include an evaluation of the impact of EU membership on 
British foreign policy.  
 
Defining europeanization as taking place when ‘something in the national (UK) 
political system is affected by something European’
2 or as the ‘administrative 
adaptation of the national(UK) state to membership of the EU’ or as ‘domestic 
change caused by European integration’ serves to clarify what is meant by 
europeanization ( although it raise some interesting questions about how easy it 
is in practice to make the distinction  between the EU and Europe more 
generally) but it still leaves unresolved the question of cause and effect. The FCO 
has been affected by  UK membership of the EU but the specific nature of the 
EU’s foreign policy competences and procedures (especially the CFSP) have 
themselves been affected by the input of the FCO and its diplomats. The FCO 
has played a major role in the evolution of the CFSP ( ? from an 
intergovernmental  to a transgovernmental mode of policy making) but it is the 
very nature of the CFSP ( in particular its recent ‘Brusselsisation’) that we might   2 
then want to identify as having a specific impact on the FCO. Thus 
europeanization is not just about  the impact of one level of governance (EU) on 
another (the UK central government); it is inevitably about a circular process 
with constant feedback. 
 
Even if one agrees that  to look for evidence of europeanization is to look for 
evidence of domestic change related to EU membership one is still left with the 
problem of establishing cause and effect. Many of the changes /adaptations that 
the FCO has experienced  in recent years coincide with Britain’s’ EU membership 
but they can also be seen as responses to broader trends in international 
relations such as interdependence,  globalization and the  general ‘blurring of 
boundaries’ between the domestic and the foreign. The difficulty of identifying 
the causes of change in this area are nicely illustrated by the recent publication 
of two similar volumes. In Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation (Macmillan 
1999) Brian Hocking has edited a book of contributions that examines  changes 
in  a selection of foreign ministries and diplomatic services drawn from all 
corners of the world. The introduction and conclusions seek to generalise about 
the impact of globalization, interdependence etc on diplomatic organisations and 
procedures. In European Foreign Ministries: Integrating Diplomats (Palgrave 
2002)) the same editor Brian Hocking (with David Spence) has produced a 
similar volume,  this time limited to the foreign ministries of the EU member 
states, which has as its implicit focus the europeanization of EU member state 
foreign ministries. It is thus hard to be clear about the extent to which significant 
changes in the FCO are related specifically to EU membership or more generally 
to changes either to national circumstance or the broader international context. 
Thus we shall see that the FCO’s role in the management of UK policy towards 
the EU is potentially challenged  by the further development of devolution in the 
UK if the devolved authorities seek more autonomous international relationships. 
It is hard however to explain UK devolution in terms of europeanization (despite 
the European Commission’s enthusiasm for the idea of a Europe of the Regions)   3 
and the problem of the hollowing out of the  state is not restricted to EU member 
states. Foreign ministries and national diplomatic services face a general problem 
of  losing control over  international relations between sub-national authorities. 
Similarly the blurring of boundaries between the domestic and the foreign  
presents a formidable challenge to national foreign ministries  which is 
highlighted and emphasized by EU membership but by no means limited to it. 
UKREP is an exceptional external representation but its role as a kind of mini-
Whitehall is to be found to a lesser extent in a number of UK embassies abroad 
and not just in those in other EU member states. 
 
 
This paper examines the changing role of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) as it has adapted to a transformed world. Particular attention is 
given to the impact of Britain’s membership of the European Union which was 
anticipated in the 1960s but which did not take place until 1973.  
The current structure and role of the FCO reflects a cumulative 
adjustment to change over a considerable period of time, although the pace of 
that change has quickened since Britain became a member of  the European 
Union.  In the past fifteen years, the FCO has been faced with major 
international changes - the collapse of communism in Europe, the end of the cold 
war international system, the widening and deepening of the European Union 
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia – as well as a major 
domestic change – the election of a Labour Government in May of 1997, after a 
prolonged eighteen year period of successive Conservative administrations. 
The history and role of the Foreign Office in the making and 
implementation of British foreign policy has been told in a number of places
3 and 
needs only a brief rehearsal here. The Foreign Service can be traced back to 
1479 and the Foreign Office to 1782. Until the mid-1960s the UK chose to handle 
its imperial and post imperial relationships separately from its dealings with the 
rest of the world. The Colonial Office, the India Office, the Dominions Office and   4 
the Commonwealth Relations Office have all evolved and merged over time to 
form the Commonwealth Office and, in 1968, the Foreign Office and the 
Commonwealth Office themselves merged to form the present FCO.  The present 
Diplomatic Service was established in 1965 amalgamating the Foreign Service, 
the Commonwealth Service and the Trade Commission Service
4. 
The administration of British aid has a complex history of semi-
detachment from the FCO. Overseas aid was traditionally administered by the 
Foreign Office but in 1964 the Labour Government created a separate Ministry of 
Overseas Development headed by a Cabinet minister. Since then Conservative 
governments (1970-1974 and 1979–1997) have chosen to handle aid through an 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA) under the overall control of the 
FCO whilst Labour governments (1964-1970 and 1974-1979) preferred a 
separate Ministry. In 1997 the incoming Labour government maintained this 
pattern by establishing a Department for International Development headed by 
Claire Short with a seat in the Cabinet. 
The Foreign Office and now the FCO have always had a central role in the 
management of Britain’s external policies. This role has been challenged by the 
relative decline of Britain’s position and role in the international system 
throughout the twentieth century (most spectacularly since 1945) and by the 
changing nature of international relations  - the shifting agenda, the changing 
basis of power and influence and the growth of interdependence and of 
multilateral attempts to manage that interdependence.  Despite these trends, 
which have tended to blur the distinction between foreign and domestic politics 
and policy, the FCO has managed to retain a central role in the shaping and 
management of Britain’s external policies. The most significant example of 
Britain’s involvement in multilateral management is, of course, its membership of 
the European Union that has both challenged and, in many ways, enhanced the 
role of the FCO.
5 The continued strength of the FCO has, in recent years, played 
a major part in enabling Britain to ‘punch above its weight’ in the international 
system in general. Britain has always been a major player within the European   5 
Union but it is perhaps only since the election of the Labour government in 1997 
that Britain has aspired to a significant ‘leadership’ role. Even before he was 
elected Mr Blair established a clear link between Britain’s world role and the 
significance of its EU membership when he argued that the aspiration to be ‘a 
major global player’ would be forfeit unless we accepted Europe as our base.
6  
Faced with the contradictory pressures of changing demands and diminishing 
resources, the FCO has firmly resisted ‘external’ attempts to reform it whilst 
demonstrating an effective willingness and ability to make the necessary internal 
adaptations. It is a measure of the FCO’s adaptive ability that the Diplomatic 
Service has successfully retained its separate and unique status within the British 
administration and that successive Foreign Secretaries have preserved their 
senior position within the British Cabinet hierarchy. The position of Foreign 
Secretary remains one of the most important posts in the British government 
although the particular importance of the relationship between Prime Minister 
and Foreign Secretary has been modified in recent years by the growing power 
of the Prime Minister’s office in Downing Street
7. This  can in part be attributed 
to the impact of Britain’s membership of the EU and the  external policy 
leadership and coordinating role that the expansion of the power of European 
Council gives to the head of the government and his office. 
The general expansion in the number of states in the international system 
has challenged the FCO’s determination to preserve Britain’s global power status 
by retaining a global representation. This FCO managed to do this in response to 
the proliferation of states as a result of decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s; 
the new challenges posed by the emergence of new states following the break-
up of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia in the 1990s have proved more testing 
and the FCO has struggled to keep up with its major European rivals.
8 In 2003 
Britain maintained 233 posts of which 153 are embassies (compared with just 
136 countries in1968) whilst Germany maintained 208 posts and France 279 
posts 
9. In April 1999 the FCO had a total of 5635 UK-based staff of whom 2295 
were serving overseas (whilst Germany  had 3361 and France 5669 staff serving   6 
overseas)
10  although these figures partly reflect a continuing British tradition of, 
and preference for, employing quite high numbers of local staff in its missions 
abroad. The rapid expansion of tourism and travel along with an increase in the 
number of states has increased certain of the demands on overseas posts whilst 
the increased ease and speed of both travel and communications has raised 
contradictory doubts about the purpose of, and need for, overseas posts. These 
and other issues relating to both change and Britain’s declining resources have 
meant that the FCO has been the subject of a number of formal inquiries and 
reviews in recent years. The Plowden
11, Duncan
12 and Berrill
13 Reports in 1964, 
1969 and 1977 respectively all made recommendations which the FCO was 
inclined to resist whilst more recently the 1992 Structural Review, the 1995 
Fundamental Expenditure Review and the 1996 Senior Management Review were 
all conducted ‘in house’, albeit with the participation of outside consultants, and 
produced recommendations that the FCO was more inclined to accept. The latter 
reviews were partly occasioned by a self-perceived need to rethink certain 
aspects of the FCO’s work (its staffing policies in the face of demands for racial 
and sexual equality of opportunity and for more rapid career advancement in a 
Diplomatic Service that had become ‘top-heavy’ as a result of various 
administrative reorganisations; its postings policies as more FCO spouses were 
reluctant to sacrifice their own careers in order to accompany FCO staff abroad 
and its staff training and development policies as the demands for functional 
expertise increased) partly by the need to find further financial savings and 
partly by the general trend of  governmental reform (market testing, financial 
devolution, delayering performance targeting and analysis etc.) which has 
developed in recent years. 
During Mrs Thatcher’s period in office, the FCO was subjected to a 
continuous level of criticism by a dominant Prime Minister who became 
increasingly interested, as all long-serving prime ministers tend to, in playing a 
major role in foreign affairs
14.  Mrs Thatcher’s frustration and problems with the 
European Union, which she associated with the pro-European leanings of the   7 
FCO, led her to contemplate, but in fact never to seriously implement, the 
possibility of building up Downing Street’s foreign policy capabilities as a counter 
to the central role of the FCO. In Charles Powell, a career FCO official, who 
became increasingly politicised during his time at No.10, Mrs Thatcher had an 
ambitious and effective Private Secretary for Overseas Affairs who was more 
than capable of assisting her in her occasional forays against the FCO – his part 
in the drafting of her attack on the EU and its President,  Jacques Delors, in a 
speech made at the College of Europe in 1988 is a case in point
15. Mrs Thatcher 
also appointed a succession of ex-ambassadors to advise her but, by and large, 
they were always careful not to undermine their previous employers when 
briefing her. Under Mrs Thatcher, plans for the establishment of a Foreign Affairs 
Unit along similar lines to the American National Security Council
16were 
overtaken by the events that led to her eventual resignation. John Major showed 
no real inclination  to side-step either the Foreign Secretary or the FCO in the 
handling of foreign policy in general or the EU specifically. In April 1998 Mr Blair 
rejected proposals put forward by some of his colleagues for creating a powerful 
prime minister’s department based upon a reconstructed cabinet office.
17 
However there was a small controversy over the revelation that the Prime 
Minister had appointed several overseas personal envoys ( Lords Levy, Paul and 
Ahmed). Press comment saw these appointments as indicative of ‘an American 
style of foreign policy’
18 and noted the fact that these envoys were 
unaccountable to parliament and could be seen to be part of a process that by-
passed the FCO. When Mr Blair was returned to office in 2001 however he did 
take significant steps to enhance the role of Downing Street over both EU policy 
and foreign policy towards the rest of the world. Mr Blair chose to move two of 
the Cabinet Office Secretariats (dealing with Overseas and Security policy and 
with the EU) into Downing Street under the control of his two foreign policy 
advisors – Sir Stpehen Wall (ex head of UKREP) and Sir David Manning (ex head 
of the UK Delegation to NATO).    8 
The FCO is staffed largely by members of the Diplomatic Service but with 
some members of the Home Civil Service. Before the 1997 Labour Government 
established the Ministry for International Development, the FCO had a Diplomatic 
Wing and an Aid Wing (Overseas Development Administration). The Diplomatic 
Wing is staffed by around 6000 UK-based personnel (around 4000 in the 
Diplomatic Service and 2000 Home Civil Servants mainly in support roles in 
London) who serve both at home and abroad. In 2003 there were around 2295 
UK-based staff serving abroad and they were assisted in posts by 7841 locally 
engaged staff
19. The FCO have been forced to accept considerable reductions in 
budgets and overall staffing levels (21% since 1980) in recent years. The FCO 
vote (minus the variable costs of peacekeeping operations) is around £1 billion at 
1995 prices whilst the Department for International Development (DFID) 
receives around £2.2 billion (the fifth largest aid budget in the world).The FCO 
thus has a relatively small budget in contrast to the £20+ billion  allocated to  
the Ministry of Defence or the nearly  £100 billion expenditure of the Department 
of Social Security. The FCO has hardly any programme expenditure ( unlike the 
DFID) and so budget cuts can be directly translated into staff slots or overseas 
posts.
20 As a consequence FCO morale has been quite badly affected in recent 
years by the constant budgetary pressures.  Staff who have become 
disillusioned, either by budget reductions, seemingly inconsiderate postings 
policies or the lack of opportunity for career advancement have been able to find 
better paid and often less demanding employment in the private sector. 
The FCO is headed by the Foreign Secretary who is always a senior 
member of the Government. There are usually at least three junior ministers 
(four when ODA is situated within the FCO) one of whom, in recent years has 
been designated Minister for Europe.  
The FCO is headed by a Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) who is responsible 
both for the administration of the FCO and the work of overseas posts through a 
Board of Management and for strategic policy advice to ministers through a 
Policy Advisory Board. In recent years the work of the PUS has become   9 
increasingly focussed on the management of the FCO in London. The post of 
Political Director, which was initially created so that Britain could play its part in 
the EU’s system of European Political Cooperation, is now effectively the top 
policy advisory post. Whereas twenty years ago the PUS would always 
accompany the Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister on his travels overseas now it 
is usually the Political Director who clocks up the air miles whilst the PUS stays at 
home to look after the shop – the specific job of Political Director can be 
explained in terms of europeanization but the role that he or she plays is the 
result of both EU membership and other factors. 
The basic FCO unit remains the geographical desk within a geographical 
Department and Command. Although there has been a considerable growth in 
functional departments in response to the ‘internationalisation’  and 
‘europeanization’of a number of traditional domestic issues and to the growth of 
multilateral forums, the FCO has resisted suggestions that, as a multi-functional 
organisation, it should reorganise itself around its functions although in the case 
of EU membership this is now changing. The Fundamental Expenditure Review of 
1995 argued for the preservation of a structure based on regional and 
multilateral organisation partly because of the high estimated cost of 
restructuring the FCO and partly because of the continuing logic of geographical 
specialism. The FCO believes that it’s knowledge of specific countries and its 
development of bilateral relationships that span across a number of specific 
functions, adds significant value to the advancement and coordination of British 
interests. If the FCO were to be reorganised along functional lines then the fear 
would be that a number of functions could then be ‘hived off’ to domestic 
ministries along the lines suggested by the CPRS Report ( see below). In January 
2000, shortly before he became Minister for Energy in the reshuffle that followed 
the resignation of Peter Mandelson, Peter Hain,  then a Foreign Office Minister, 
published a pamphlet
21 in which he advocated the scrapping of Departments 
based on geographical divisions in favour of ‘issues’ departments dealing with 
subjects such as human rights, the environment and conflict prevention
22 To the   10 
extent that the ‘desks’ for other EU member states have recently been removed 
from a geographical command and placed within functional (EU) departments 
then Hain’s proposals seem to be gaining acceptance at least at least as far as 
the management of European multilateral and bilateral policies are concerned.  
The FCO faces two types of coordination problem in its management of 
Britain’s external relations. Firstly it has to ensure effective internal 
communication and coordination both within the FCO in London and between 
London and the network of overseas posts. Secondly, as the agenda expands to 
directly involve many Home Departments in both the shaping and execution of 
external policy ( of which the EU is the most obvious example), the FCO has a 
major responsibility to ensure coherence and consistency across Whitehall. In 
pursuing this second objective, the FCO also has a clear interest in retaining as 
much overall control over British foreign policy-making and implementation as is 
possible. 
   Within the FCO, the problems raised by the proliferation of functional and 
multilateral commands cutting across the geographical divisions is best illustrated 
by reference to arrangements for dealing with the countries of Western Europe 
and the EU(see above and in the next section). Across Whitehall the coordination 
of British foreign policy is not in the exclusive control of the FCO. Long gone are 
the days when all contacts with the outside world were handled by the FCO. 
Nowadays just as the FCO has sprouted a number of functional departments that 
in many ways ‘shadow’ the work of Home Departments so, in turn, most Home 
Departments have developed their own international and European sections. The 
FCO continues to play a major role in the coordination of all these different 
aspects of Britain’s external policy but the British system also recognises that, 
with reference to a number of cross-cutting issues, the FCO is not the 
unchallenged sole determinant of the overall British interest but merely an 
‘interested’ department amongst many others. In these cases, the Cabinet 
system and the work of the Cabinet Office provide consistency and coherence.  
At the very top of the decision-making process, the British Cabinet is meant to be   11 
collegial and the doctrine of collective responsibility pertains
23. In practice many 
decisions are delegated down to Cabinet Committees of which the Committee on 
Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) and the Committee on the Intelligence 
Services both chaired by the Prime Minister and the Sub-Committee on European 
Questions ((E)DOP), chaired by the Foreign Secretary, are the most important in 
relation to foreign policy.
24 
The work of these ministerial committees and of their official counterparts 
is supported by the Cabinet Office, headed by the Secretary of the Cabinet who 
is also the head of the Home Civil Service. There were five separate Secretariats 
within the Cabinet Office of which three (the Overseas and Defence Secretariat, 
the Joint Intelligence Secretariat and the European Secretariat) had external 
relations coordination responsibilities
25. Two of these Overseas and defence and 
Europe have now been moved from the Cabinet Office to the Prime Ministers 
Office in Downing Street. The Secretariats are quite small, staffed mainly by 
home civil servants but also by members of the diplomatic service. The 
relationship between the FCO and the staff of the relevant secretariats is a close 
one; in no sense are they rivals although on issues where the FCO is in dispute 
with other government departments it is the Secretariat staff who record the 
minutes of the meetings at which government policy is thrashed out. 
It might be expected that the FCO would fit uneasily into the broader 
Whitehall picture because of the separate recruitment, training and career 
structure of the diplomatic service and because so many members of the 
diplomatic service spend so much of their careers in posts overseas. However, 
whilst there is undoubtedly some rivalry and whilst some members of both the 
diplomatic service and the home civil service clearly retain prejudiced and 
stereotyped views of each other, it is hard to find examples of external policy 
being adversely affected by internal bureaucratic conflict
26 involving the FCO as 
one of the warring parties. On the contrary, the most spectacular inter-
departmental dispute of recent times, which had major external overtones, was 
the Westland crisis 
27, which centred on a dispute between the Department of   12 
Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Defence. As we shall see below, the FCO 
is in almost permanent conflict with the Treasury over the allocation of 
government resources but no more so than any other government department in 
recent years. 
The FCO has been the subject of a number of formal enquiries in recent 
years. The Plowden Report delivered in 1964 ‘provoked the most radical changes 
and the least controversy’.
28 It was responsible both for the creation of  the 
unified diplomatic service and for the eventual amalgamations that led to the 
establishment of the FCO. Despite the obvious decline in British global influence 
that was apparent by the mid 1960s the Plowden report was  ‘friendly’ towards 
the FCO in its assumption that Britain should nevertheless maintain the foreign 
policy capability of a global power. To this end, Plowden recommended improved 
conditions of employment for the diplomatic service which it felt should be 
maintained at a level approximately 10% above basic requirements so as to 
allow for enhanced training, leave and travel. These proposals were never 
implemented and subsequent inquiries were never so generous in their 
recommendations. 
In 1969, after the traumas of devaluation and the military withdrawal 
from east of Suez, the Duncan Report 
29 was much tougher on the FCO. It set 
out to achieve savings of between 5 and 10 per cent by distinguishing between 
two distinct areas of British attention. Duncan recommended that the countries 
of western Europe plus North America should be grouped together in an Area of 
Concentration whilst the rest of the world (including Japan and the whole of the 
Middle East!) would form an Outer Area.  Countries within the Area of 
Concentration and one or two other ‘special cases’ would be served by 
Comprehensive Posts, which would be staffed in the traditional way, but most of 
the countries that fell within the Outer Area would be served by much reduced 
Selective Posts from which there would be virtually no political reporting.. The 
main emphasis of diplomacy was to be on commercial work and the Duncan 
Report made it clear that it did not consider a foreign policy apparatus suitable   13 
for a global power with comprehensive political and commercial interests any 
longer appropriate for Britain. This view of the role of the FCO and the 
Diplomatic Service was of course strongly contested by the FCO, whose delaying 
tactics were all that were required as the change of government that occurred in 
June of 1970 led to the shelving of the Duncan Report. 
Even more radical however was the report produced by the Central Policy 
Review Staff (CPRS) under Kenneth Berrill
30. Charged with recommending ‘the 
most suitable, effective and economic means of representing and promoting 
British interests both at home and overseas’ the CPSR team came up with a 
proposal that the Diplomatic Service and the Home Civil Service be effectively 
merged creating a Foreign Policy Group. This suggestion was based on the 
assumption that the necessary specialisms required to  advance British interests 
were to be found in the Home Civil Service and that the essentially political 
advice, expensively provided by the Diplomatic Service, was no longer relevant to 
British needs. Were this advice to be made today it would almost certainly be 
regarded as ‘europeanization’! In addition, the CPSR Report called for the closing 
of 55 posts on top of the 30 that had been closed since Duncan reported.  The 
CPRS Report was nothing more than a direct attack on the FCO and all that it 
stood for and it provoked an enormously hostile response. Typical was the 
reaction of one of Britain’s senior Ambassadors whose Paris embassy was singled 
out for particular attack for the ‘lavishness’ of its hospitality. In his diaries, 
Nicholas Henderson records ‘This is  the third such enquiry in the past fifteen 
years. True, Plowden and Val Duncan did the service no harm but the setting up 
of yet another and outwardly more hostile enquiry has not been good for 
morale’
31 The FCO produced a line by line rebuttal of the entire report and they 
were supported in their endeavors by  Jim Callaghan, the Prime Minister, who 
had fond memories of his time as Foreign Secretary. The CPRS Report provoked 
such a hostile reaction, with hundreds of serving diplomats threatening to resign 
rather than face incorporation into the Home Civil Service, that it probably never 
stood much chance of being implemented. Despite its spirited and successful   14 
defence, the FCO showed in later years that it recognised some of the problems 
highlighted by the CPRS Report, even if it rejected the proposed solutions. 
More recently, the FCO has been given a more searching examination by 
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, particularly over its 
response to new commercial challenges in the Far East and over its management 
of Public Diplomacy via the BBC World Service and the British Council (both of 
whom are FCO responsibilities and paid for under the FCO vote). In the 1990s 
the FCO has responded to the general climate of government reform by holding 
its own internal Structural Review in 1992, a Fundamental Expenditure Review 
(FER) in 1995 and a Senior Management Review (SMR) in 1996. The acceptance 
and implementation of these more recent reports are part of the FCO’s response 
to a changing European and international environment although it is hard to 
distinguish between the two or to isolate influences which are specifically 
European or EU.  
 
 
 
 
In recent years the FCO has faced a number of specific issues in addition to the 
general problem of managing the consequences of Britain’s general decline in 
the international hierarchy. The biggest external challenge has arisen from the 
need to adjust both the procedures and substance of British foreign policy to the 
growing importance of the European Union. Participation in the European Union 
has given particular emphasis to the blurring of the boundaries between 
domestic and foreign policy.  A considerable amount of EU business is conducted 
by officials from the Home Civil Service working in domestic ministries such as 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department for the 
Environment, Food and Agriculture (DEFRA) Where once all dealings with foreign 
governments were conducted through the FCO and Britain’s embassies abroad, 
now there are direct dealings between domestic ministries and their opposite   15 
numbers in the other EU member states
32. This has highlighted a  number of 
issues of both coordination and control
33 that have challenged the FCO’s 
dominant role in the identification and pursuit of the British interests overseas.  
In the past a separate European Ministry has been proposed and, under 
Edward Heath in the 1970-74 Conservative administration, a Cabinet minister 
with EU responsibilities (Geoffrey Rippon) was appointed to support the Foreign 
Secretary, although, once the accession negotiations were completed, the post 
was soon abolished. The FCO has always resisted attempts to separate EU 
business from the overall responsibilities of the FCO and successive Foreign 
Secretaries have shown little enthusiasm for suggestions that the present 
Minister of State for Europe be elevated to Cabinet rank. A Foreign Secretary 
stripped of his EU responsibilities would suffer an enormous loss of stature so 
central is the EU to so many internal and external policy issues. Nevertheless the 
idea was raised again
34 and was discussed also at the Convention on the Future 
of Europe with the suggestion that senior cabinet ministers (Jacques Delors even 
suggested deputy prime ministers!) reporting directly to prime ministers might be 
permanently based in Brussels and charged with sustaining the authority of the 
European Council between the six-monthly summits. This would indeed have 
called into question the role of the FCO and of the Foreign Secretary, especially 
if, as was mooted at the time, the UK candidate had been Peter Mandelson. 
Proposals to transfer the management (as opposed to the coordination and 
strategic consideration) of European business to the Cabinet Office or to 
Downing Street would have had the same effect.  
The FCO has undoubtedly gained from the centralising tendencies that EU 
membership has encouraged and Smith has identified the rise of ‘an informal, 
yet powerful elite comprising Number 10, the FCO, the Cabinet Office and the UK 
permanent representation (UKREP)’
35. However the British system of 
coordination, whilst it gives the FCO by far the major role, is also designed to 
ensure that where necessary the FCO is treated as another interested 
Department and not as the sole determinant of the UK national interest. The role   16 
of the European Secretariat which arranges, chairs and records the results of 
interdepartmental discussions at all levels
36 ensures that the FCO can not claim 
sole ownership or authorship of EU policy. The Cabinet Office is also responsible 
for the process whereby Parliament is informed and consulted about EU 
legislation. The FCO is usually represented in the European Secretariat but only 
with one official in a team of about seven – the rest coming from the home civil 
service. 
However one has to be careful about making too much of the restraints 
on the FCO’s role in EU policy-making and coordination. The European 
Secretariat is quite small, although large by Cabinet Office standards, and it does 
rely heavily on FCO support. Similarly whilst UKREP is indeed an unusual 
embassy, with more than 50% of its staff being drawn from the home civil 
service, it has always been headed by an ambassador from the FCO and the FCO 
retains the right to oversee its instructions. The position of Permanent 
Representative is an extremely powerful one with the incumbent responsible for 
the day to day management of EU business in Brussels as well as usually playing 
a pivotal role in Treaty negotiations within the Intergovernmental Conference 
framework
37. The UK Permanent Representative, additionally gets to return to 
London each Friday to participate in EU policy-making meetings both within the 
FCO and the Cabinet Office – an opportunity resented by many home based 
officials and much envied by all other UK ambassadors. 
Thus, despite the constraints mentioned above and elsewhere in this 
chapter, the FCO probably has succeeded in retaining a predominant EU role 
within the UK system. This is partly because in its competent handling of  EU 
business the FCO has earned the respect of those working within other 
government departments and partly because the FCO itself has been quite 
relaxed about allowing other government departments to get on with EU 
business that clearly lies within their exclusive competence. Although Smith 
argues that ‘as EU business increases, the FCO and the Cabinet Office are losing 
control  and departments are increasingly conducting business with the   17 
Commission and other member states directly’
38 and that the FCO is incorrect in 
its belief that it still controls contact with Brussels, it is the contention of this 
chapter that, on the important EU matters, the FCO retains a significant degree 
of control and that it is probably wise to not try and take on business that it is 
beyond both its competence and its resources. 
Within the FCO, following several recent reorganisations, EU matters and 
bilateral relations with individual EU member states are now handled within the 
same Command – the EU Command which now has four departments (CFSP, EU 
Internal, EU External and EU Bilateral) who report to the FCO Director EU and 
then (except for CFSP Dept, who report to the Political Director) to the Director 
Economic and EU.  CFSP Department, in effect, provide a secretariat for the FCO 
Political Director who  has chief operational  responsibility for the UK’s input into 
the CFSP process. The Wider Europe Command brings together all the   
Departments dealing with Central and Eastern Europe (except the Balkans, which 
has a separate Command) and Western European countries which are not in the 
EU. NB THIS HAS NOW CHANGED BUT I AM STILL TRYING TO SORT OUT 
THESE CHANGES. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING TO NOTE IS THAT BILATERAL 
RELATIONS WITH OTHER EU MEMBER STATES ARE NOW MANAGED FROM 
WITHIN EU DEPARTMENTS 
The Labour Government’s devolution policies may well eventually have an 
impact on the way that the UK relates to the EU although the Government seems 
determined to try and retain London’s control over these matters.
39 Each of the 
devolved administrations has agreed a concordat with the Westminster 
Government covering their role in international relations in general and the EU in 
particular. These were agreed without undue difficulty and the arrangements so 
far seem to be working well. The anticipated problems and disagreements have 
not so far materialised, with the result that the FCO has now disbanded its short-
lived Devolved Administrations Department. Whilst the UK government is 
determined to remain responsible for international relations, including relations 
with the EU, it may well find itself under pressure form the devolved   18 
administrations as their work develops. Already there have been suggestions that 
Scotland might seek to expand the level of its separate representation in 
Brussels
40 and this would eventually threaten the role of UKREP and the UK 
Permanent Representative.  Comparison with the growing EU role of the German 
Lander in this context may well be instructive in the future. In the long term, of 
course, the possibility of devolution leading to independence would challenge the 
whole concept of UK foreign policy and the role of the UK FCO. 
Finally we should mention the recent efforts made by Mr Blair to broaden 
the nature of the UK government’s relationship with its EU partners
41 because 
these too may challenge the role of the FCO in the future. The Prime Minister ha 
always been keen to establish stronger links between the centre-left parties in 
power in a number of the 15 EU states although in recent years their number 
has declined and Mr Blairs willingness to develop bilateral relationships with 
almost anybody regardless of political stance has increased. For a brief period Mr 
Blair appointed Mr Mandelson, seemingly with Mr Cook’s blessing to act as a 
‘roving ambassador’ but this did not appear to last long or bear much fruit. 
For his part Mr Cook when Foreign Secretary set up a powerful committee to 
increase the Labour party’s influence in Europe
42. The committee, which is 
chaired by the Minister for Europe (a post which has had a surprising number of 
incumbents since Labour returned to power and which is clearly not regarded as 
significant by either the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary), included policy 
advisors from Downing Street, the FCO and the Treasury. It represents the kind 
of development that the FCO has to embrace but, one suspects,  with the 
intention of smothering rather than nurturing a potential challenger to its control 
of UK relations with European governments. The idea of someone like Mr 
Mandelson becoming a ‘roving European Ambassador’ was about as pleasing to 
the mandarins within the FCO as the idea of a foreign policy unit in Downing 
Street or a Minister for Europe in the Cabinet Office.  
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The FCO has responded reasonably well to change whether the stimulus comes 
from within, from Europe or from the wider international system. As we noted 
above, its basic tactic has been to strongly resist all attempts to impose reform 
from outside, whilst internally making some quite radical adjustments to the way 
that it organises itself and carries out its work. The changes in the substance of 
foreign policy and the blurring of boundaries between foreign and domestic 
policy have forced the FCO to work much more closely with other government 
departments, both within Britain and abroad, and to organise itself for the 
demands of multilateral (of which the EU is the most significant) as well as 
bilateral diplomacy and negotiation. The FCO has sought to manage the interface 
with other government departments as smoothly as possible
43; it has considered 
and sensibly rejected the idea of charging them for the work that its overseas 
posts carry out for them; it has instructed those of its departments, such as 
European Union Department (Internal), who ‘face’ domestic ministries to consult 
with them about their requirements vis-a-vis FCO posts overseas and it has 
sought to maintain its position, if not of supremacy, then at least of ‘primus inter 
pares’ in the overall direction of British foreign policy. Foreign policy is 
increasingly about coordination and the FCO is clearly the most important of the 
coordinating departments and has made considerable efforts to maintain this 
position, whilst continuing to argue the case for its separate identity. This has 
not been seriously challenged since the 1977 CPRS Report; instead the FCO 
position was endorsed by the 1994 White Paper on the Civil Service which stated 
that “The Diplomatic Service is a separate branch of the public service with its 
own particular needs and structure”
44. 
The growing complexity of the foreign policy agenda has forced the FCO 
to develop more and more functional competences but it has responded to this 
challenge by firmly sticking to an organisational structure that subsumes 
functional expertise to geographical and multilateral Commands and therefore   20 
emphasises the importance of the FCO’s coordination role in relation to other 
government departments. This however may at last be changing.  Similarly the 
FCO, by preserving the pivotal role of the ambassador in overseas posts, has 
resisted the argument that domestic specialists who are posted overseas should 
report directly to their ‘home’ departments.  Thus, in the name of coherence and 
consistency,  the FCO has successfully defended its role as ‘gatekeeper’ both at 
home and abroad, even though the participants in the foreign policy process are 
increasingly drawn from a number of non-FCO sources.
45 This is most clearly 
seen in the key roles that the FCO and the UK Permanent Representation to the 
EU (UKREP)
46 play in the overall management of British policy towards the EU. 
Changes in British society and in the approach to work and working 
conditions have forced the FCO to reconsider the way that it recruits staff and 
carries out its business. Attempts to open up the recruitment process have had 
mixed results; whilst the FCO can point to figures that suggest a steady increase 
in the employment of women
47 and in the decline of candidates from private 
schools, its record on the employment of representatives of ethnic minorities is 
not impressive and it attracted highly unfavorable publicity in January of 1996 
when its most senior woman, Pauline Neville-Jones, resigned ‘noisily’ after being 
denied the position of ambassador to Paris, on the face of it because she was 
both female and unmarried even though there have been women ambassadors 
in several countries, eg Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Chile and South Africa. 
On a variety of staff matters the FCO is increasingly in competition with a 
number of other employers for the talents of the young high flyers that it used to 
recruit with ease.  Relatively poor pay, poor conditions of service, long working 
hours, slim chances of rapid promotion in a service where a number of senior 
posts have been cut on efficiency and  economy grounds have all taken their toll 
and the FCO has been relatively slow to respond, leading to reports of  growing 
dissatisfaction and low morale.
48 Whether a Labour Government intent on 
‘opening up’ the FCO to a wider recruitment base and more open and modern  
working practices
49 is likely to restore the once high morale of the Diplomatic   21 
Service remains to be seen. Many of the most unpopular changes to the nature 
of the work, and thus to the prospects of a satisfactory career, have been driven 
by the constant need to find financial savings rather than by the nature of the 
work. It does not seem very likely that this pressure will be significantly eased in 
the foreseeable future and so the FCO will continue to be handicapped in its 
efforts to create a modern service capable of attracting  and retaining high 
quality staff. This may well force the FCO in the future to give much more 
serious consideration to moves within the EU to create a European diplomatic 
service involving  both Commission and Council officials and those from EU 
national diplomatic services
50  
Recent reports have recognised the fact that, in a number of areas the 
FCO has been relatively slow to move with the times and efforts have been made 
to catch up. In its use of information technology the FCO has been slow, in 
comparison to other government departments and other EU governments to 
adopt advanced methods of electronic communication. However, whilst it has 
taken a long time to introduce a secure e-mail system,
51 the FCO was one of the 
first British government departments to provide a public service on the Internet. 
The FCO Web Site (www.fco.gov.uk) was first established in 1995 and is 
generally regarded as first rate – a new site was added in December 1997 to 
serve the UK Presidency of the EU during the first half of 1998 and another was 
created to handle the interface with the public over the debate on the Future of 
Europe. The FCO web site serves both to enhance the ‘public diplomacy’ side of 
the FCO’s work and to provide instant access to non classified information for 
overseas posts. The aim is get everything online as soon as its embargo is lifted 
and most speeches or reports delivered to Parliament are now available before 
they are released to the media through traditional channels.
52 
As well as seeking to preserve its central role in Whitehall by improving its 
links with other government departments, the FCO has also had to develop 
strategies for reforming its own internal structure and management practices, 
partly in response to changes in the foreign policy environment including the EU   22 
and partly in response to the general pressures for governmental reform that 
have developed in the last decade. The FCO strategy seems to have been to try 
and be seen to participate in this process of change and reform with as much 
enthusiasm as possible, whilst preserving its separate status and warding off any 
attempts to downgrade its overall significance by placing organisational emphasis 
on functional rather than geographical and multilateral coordination tasks. 
To this end, as well as reemphasising, reinforcing and, where appropriate 
in Europe and South Asia, reorganising, its geographic Commands, the FCO has 
also sought to implement a policy of devolving both financial and management 
responsibility down through Commands to  departments and to overseas posts in 
line with similar developments elsewhere in the government service.. The FCO 
has sought over time to remove a complete layer of senior management (DUS 
level) by making geographic Commands directly answerable to the PUS and to 
give more responsibility at departmental level to officials, by encouraging them 
to brief ministers directly rather than moving documents through several layers 
of authorisation and control.  Attempts have also been made to improve the role 
of policy planning in the FCO (partly in association with other EU foreign 
ministries), to better  associate the work of the Research Analysts with their 
customer departments and to reorganise the management structure so that 
those responsible for policy planning and advice and those responsible for the 
management of resources are more closely associated with each others work. 
This latter objective has been partly achieved by devolution and partly by 
unifying the Policy Advisory Board and the Board of Management and 
strengthening their links  with the Commands as well as their ‘visibility’ to the 
rest of the FCO. A number of these reforms can be tracked around the Foreign 
Ministries of the other EU member states but whether this can be described as 
europeanization, adaptation, emulation or policy transfer is a debatable point 
The FCO has revised its mission statement three times in recent years so 
as to relate its corporate objectives  more clearly to its core functions and also to 
facilitate better monitoring of  those objectives and their attainment. The FCO   23 
Annual Departmental Report is now replete with lists of objectives and targets 
with regard to political and economic work as well as commercial, consular, entry 
clearance and information work and with records of their achievement. In 2003 
the FCO produced for the first time a Strategy Report which maintained a trend 
to show due significance to the role of the EU but also to make it clear that the 
UK also operated as an independent actor in the wider international system – the 
FCO continues to want to have its cake and eat it! The UK strategy document 
suggest that whilst the FCO may well have been subjected to europeanization it 
is not necessarily either integrating or converging  with the foreign ministries of 
the other EU member states. 
Another area where the FCO has been forced to respond to change in 
recent years concerns the growing interest of the wider public, both at home and 
abroad, in foreign policy. Domestic publics, particularly in the developed world 
and, particularly of late within the EU member states, are now less trusting of 
governments  and more aware of what they are up to in the foreign policy area. 
Britain is no exception to this general post-war trend which has, if anything , 
accelerated since the end of the cold war. The FCO must now pay more attention 
to both Parliament and the wider public in Britain whilst the state of public 
opinion in those countries which Britain seeks to influence is now also a factor 
that needs to be given far more attention than in the past. Recent meetings of 
the European Council  and the last three IGCs have been notable for the concern 
of individual European leaders for public opinion and reaction back home. The 
FCO can be criticised for being slow to react to this phenomenon. Commentators 
noted the persistent refusal of the FCO to either acknowledge or seek to reach a 
consensus with the significant ‘Falklands lobby’
53 which nevertheless exerted 
influence on British attempts to change  its policy on the ownership of the 
Falkland Islands  and the FCO and the British government in general can be 
faulted for their failure to seek a  broad domestic consensus on a whole host of 
European Union issues. Similarly the FCO was heavily criticised for its recent 
attempts to cut the budget and restrict the activities of both the BBC World   24 
Service
54 and the British Council at a time when the importance of this type of 
‘public diplomacy’ was becoming more rather than less significant.  The FCO and 
the UK government in general continue to struggle to find a way of creating a 
domestic consensus for the EU policies that they wish to pursue and the EU 
structures that they wish to support. 
However, the issue of public diplomacy has now begun to be addressed 
by the FCO. The Fundamental Expenditure Review devoted a whole section to 
the growing importance of public diplomacy  and to the need for the FCO to 
develop a public diplomacy strategy statement as well as individual country 
strategies.  The BBC World Service and the British Council are to have their 
objectives reevaluated with a view to aligning them more closely to the FCO’s 
aims and objectives and the FCO Information and Cultural Relations Departments 
have been restructured. The FCO now has a Public Diplomacy Dept and EUD(I) a 
Public Diplomacy Section.  At a recent seminar of all the UK’s  present and 
former ambassadors to the EU the present incumbent and his immediate 
predecessor both commented on their changing roles with  much less time being 
spent in COREPER and much more time being spent on more traditional 
ambassadorial work with interest groups and members of the EP. 
 
  The growing interest of the wider public in foreign policy has given 
foreign policy making and implementation an additional dimension which the 
FCO and its political masters have yet to fully understand. The pressures from 
the public often seem irrational; over Somalia, the Falklands invasion, atrocities 
in Bosnia, the question of European integration or the sale of arms to 
undesirable regimes, the British  public seemed and seem to be calling for action 
and intervention by the British Government but they also have made  it clear that 
additional costs, whether human or financial will not be tolerated. In the face of 
these contradictions the Government has been inclined to vacillate and to allow 
public opinion to gain the upper hand. It is by and large a failure of leadership 
and of will by government that has left the FCO exposed to the whims of public   25 
opinion and the media. The problems that it has faced in pursuing a consistent 
policy towards the European Union in recent years is a case in point. The FCO 
alone can not be expected to master this new foreign policy environment but, 
given a clear lead by government, it can be expected to provide the necessary 
support. At the time, many observers saw the replacement of Tony Blair’s first 
Minister for Europe (Douglas Henderson) by Joyce Quin as an indication that the 
FCO would ‘henceforth play a much bigger role in “selling” Europe to a sceptical 
British public’
55 and this was also a task entrusted to various of her successors  - 
all have failed although none have proved as disastrously antagonistic as the 
present incumbant! 
 
Conclusions 
 
In most of the areas discussed above, the FCO has developed  strategies for 
responding to change in recent years. The critical question of course is the 
extent to which this  need for change can be seen as resulting from British 
membership of the EU  These responses tend to resemble ‘fine tuning’ rather 
than radical reform but they have enabled the FCO and the Diplomatic Service to 
retain their central position in the making and implementation of British foreign 
policy. Indeed it has been argued that EU membership has provided 
opportunities for the  FCO, along with the DTI and MAFF to ‘increase their role 
and autonomy’
56 It is certainly the case that British influence in the world has 
continued to decline although participation in the European Union has, to a 
certain extent,  halted that decline by enabling Britain to benefit from the its 
collective power. In many ways Britain still aspires to maintain the foreign policy 
of a world power; little attempt has been made in recent years to significantly 
cut back Britain’s global responsibilities or ambitions. Indeed in 1995 the British 
Government went to considerable lengths at its ‘Britain in the World 
Conference’
57 to emphasise the fact that Britain retained its global role and 
should not be thought of as ‘merely’ a European power. It is probably not that   26 
surprising, therefore, that Britain should continue to attempt to maintain a   
foreign ministry and diplomatic apparatus appropriate to a power with global 
pretensions, albeit at reduced cost. THIS MAY WELL MEAN THAT THE CHAPTER 
WILL NEED TO SAY A BIT MORE ABOPUT THE EUROPEANIZATION OR NOT OF 
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY.  
One area of possible change/adjustment which previous governments 
have resisted,  concerns developments in the EU and the institutional 
consequences of pursuing a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The British 
government, despite finding it increasingly difficult to devote the necessary 
resources to its foreign policy machine, has not been tempted by the European 
option of pooling resources particularly overseas although Britain and France 
have recently (outside the EU framework) announced plans to work more closely 
together in Africa.
58 Proposals to establish joint EU embassies and eventually to 
establish a full blown European diplomatic service have been stoutly resisted by 
Britain in favour of retaining a national foreign ministry and diplomatic service, 
even though, recently, Britain has gone along with an increasing concentration of 
CFSP activity in Brussels 
59. In keeping with this approach, in March of 1999
60, 
the Foreign Secretary proposed the establishment of a permanent committee of 
deputy political directors in Brussels to steer and reinforce the CFSP. The idea of 
this committee was clearly to keep control of the CFSP firmly in the hands of 
national foreign ministries by boosting the Council of Ministers and the Council 
Secretariat rather than enhancing the Commission’s external powers. This British 
proposal led  in time to the creation of the Political and Security Committee 
which is a good example of what has been described as  the ‘Brusselsisation’ of 
the CFSP process. This is a good example of the circular nature of 
Europeanization as the FCO having advocated the establishment in Brussels of 
something like the COPS now has to adjust to its existence!  
Since Labour came to power there have been reports that the Treasury 
would like the FCO to consider merging its consular work with that of other EU 
countries
61.  However even if this were to be taken seriously, the FCO has made   27 
it clear that commercial work, immigration control and some aspects of political 
work would have to remain under separate national control.  In the 1998 
spending review, which saw the budget of the Ministry for International 
Development rise by £1.6 billion over three years, the FCO  also did rather well 
with a £220 million increase in its own budget – the first real increase for a 
decade
62 and this despite fears that the Chancellor would make the FCO pay for 
its rumored excesses.
63 In November of 1998 the Foreign Secretary announced 
that the increase in FCO funding, in combination with additional resources 
gleaned from the sale of overseas assets, would be used to increase UK 
representation in countries applying to join the EU (europeanization?) as  well as 
in the Caspian region and the far East.
64  
The FCO is more likely to counter the Treasury proposals about consular 
work by giving further consideration to plans, that already exist, to shut down 
certain consulates and replace them with a telephone hotline to officials based in 
London. It would take a bigger swing towards further EU integration than the 
Labour government has so far been willing to consider for the FCO to come 
under any serious threat from a Brussels-based alternative. 
This paper has raised some questions about the ability and willingness  of 
the FCO  to adjust to the general challenge of a transformed world and the 
specific challenge of EU membership. The conclusion would seem be that, whilst 
the FCO has undoubtedly proved itself to be a foreign ministry capable of both 
responsiveness and flexibility ( although Peter Hain when an FCO Minister talked 
of his ‘frustration that the (FCO) machine is geared to responding to new 
circumstances mostly by incremental shifts in emphasis’
65), it has yet to be fully 
tested by,  or called upon to serve, a government willing to adopt a  consistently 
proactive EU policy. If the Labour administration is to actively pursue the 
objectives, laid out in Robin Cook’s mission statement,
66 of ‘exercising leadership 
in the European Union, protecting the world’s environment, countering the 
menace of drugs, terrorism and crime, spreading the values of human rights, 
civil liberties and democracy and using its status at the UN to secure more   28 
effective international action to keep the peace of the world and to combat 
poverty’ then the FCO just might find its organisation and working practices more 
fundamentally tested than it has to date.  
At the start of the Labour administration it seemed as if the impact of EU 
membership was going to be felt more strongly in the FCO. Most observers seem 
to accept that the EU defence initiative, launched by Tony Blair at the close of 
the twenty-first Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998
67 has 
given real substance to his oft-stated desire to exert British leadership within the 
EU
68. The proposals which had been flagged for some time arose from a paper 
written inside the FCO by a senior diplomat charged with finding ways of 
revitalising the UK Presidency and maximising the potential of Britain’s future in 
Europe
69. One of the key recommendations of Robert Cooper’s (N.B IF EVER 
THERE WAS AN EUROPEANIZED BRITISH DIPLOMAT IT IS ROBERT COOPER) 
memorandum (a paper, which was worked on by the Cabinet Office and which 
was also discussed in a series of seminars on EU policy involving both British 
academics and officials)
70 was to use British military assets to develop ‘a 
European capacity to act independently in the defence field’
71. The subsequent 
development of the defence initiative, along with notable British achievements 
recorded in both the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties as well as at a number of 
recent meetings of the European Council, suggests that the FCO is still capable 
of chalking up successes and defending its turf as Britain faces up to the 
challenges posed by Europe and the wider world in the twenty-first century. 
Whether this means that it is successfully resisting europeanization or whether it 
means that is its skillfully embracing it is  something for us to debate 
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